摘要：Edge caching is crucial in the Internet of Things (IoT) by accelerating content delivery and reducing latency, offering significant advantages. However, inappropriate incentive mechanisms may prevent third-party edge caching nodes from caching data. To address the incentive challenges in edge caching, this article proposes a contract theory approach to resolve the incentive issues between content providers (CPs) (Google and Microsoft) and edge caching nodes. Initially, utilizing the framework of contract theory, the security service quality of edge caching nodes is classified into a finite number of types, and transactions between CPs and edge caching nodes are modeled. Subsequently, contract packages containing popular data content and corresponding rewards are designed for different types of edge caching nodes. Utilizing the revelation principle of contract theory addresses the problem of incomplete information in the system, enabling CPs to maximize revenue. A blockchain-based reputation mechanism is employed to identify abnormal nodes within edge caching nodes. Numerical results demonstrate that, compared to other mechanisms, our proposed contracts can effectively incentivize the participation of edge caching nodes, significantly enhance CPs' revenue, and improve content delivery efficiency and effectiveness. 漏 2014 IEEE.

ISSN号：2327-4662

卷、期、页：卷11期13：23497-23508

发表日期：2024-07-01

期刊分区（SCI为中科院分区）：一区

收录情况：SCI（科学引文索引印刷版）,EI（工程索引）,SCIE（科学引文索引网络版）

发表期刊名称：IEEE Internet of Things Journal

参与作者：李宏焘,陈莹,杨耀宗

第一作者：黄霁崴

论文类型：期刊论文

论文概要：李宏焘,陈莹,杨耀宗,黄霁崴，Revenue-Optimal Contract Design for Content Providers in IoT-Edge Caching，IEEE Internet of Things Journal，2024，卷11期13：23497-23508

论文题目：Revenue-Optimal Contract Design for Content Providers in IoT-Edge Caching